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Inside the competition for capital at some of the world’s biggest banks

Katelynn C Hipolito — Wed, 08 Apr 2026 16:08:43 +0000

Inside the competition for capital at some of the world’s biggest banks Katelynn C Hipolito Wed, 04/08/2026 - 12:08

As the U.S. economy becomes more consolidated, the strategic decisions of senior leaders at leading companies carry ever-greater weight. A lot is riding on how these companies are run, yet their day-to-day decision-making remains, in most cases, obscure.

Barbara Su. Photo by Jeffrey Porovich/Costello College of Business.

But the banking industry is an exception. As Barbara Su, assistant professor of accounting at Costello College of Business at 911��, notes, “Because the banking industry is heavily regulated, it allows us to have access to subsidiary banks’ financial information. We can observe how much money parent companies take from each subsidiary, as well as the internal capital allocation between subsidiaries by headquarters.”

Su’s forthcoming paper in Management Science finds that in multi-bank holding companies (MBHCs), especially those with multiple subsidiary banks or geographically dispersed operations, it’s essential to bridge the information gap between HQ and local subsidiaries. That is why corporate leaders strongly rely on internal accounting information, as a complement to financial performance, to help them make intramural investment decisions.

Su says that although recent rounds of deregulation and interstate banking consolidation have reduced MBHCs’ economic profile, studying their behavior is relevant “because they provide a clean empirical setting. With multiple legally distinct bank subsidiaries, we can directly observe how the parent allocates capital across units.”

“We often hear that bank holding companies should act as a ‘source of strength’ for subsidiaries. There is some truth to the ‘source of strength’ idea, but our paper also observes that holding companies don’t just allocate funds to save subsidiaries from failing. They’re also allocating funds for the better-performing ones, when the accounting reporting quality is good, to help them thrive.”

—Barbara Su, assistant professor of accounting at Costello College of Business

The paper was co-authored by Scott Liao of University of Toronto and Allison Nicoletti of University of Pennsylvania.

The researchers zeroed in on the subsidiary banks’ loan loss provision—an accounting adjustment reflecting anticipated loan defaults—as an especially meaningful indicator.

Their dataset included financial statement information from 3,031 bank subsidiaries affiliated with 799 bank holding companies, for the period 1996 to 2019.

Su’s hypothesis was that “the accuracy of the loan loss provision coming from the subsidiaries will, or should, guide the internal capital allocation at the holding company level.” In other words, HQ would be wise to interpret valid accounting information as a general quality index, helping them identify worthy targets for investment.

The evidence confirmed Su’s suspicions. The average accuracy of subsidiaries’ loan loss provisions was positively associated with HQ’s ability to pick winners, i.e., to invest in subsidiaries that would go on to achieve relatively high ROA or return on assets.

A follow-on study showed that this association was strongest for two subsets of holding companies: those more dependent on lending for their revenue, as well as those where HQ was most distant (either geographically or economically) from the local branches. Banks with troubled subsidiaries saw the weakest association between accounting information accuracy and wise internal investments. This amounts to further supporting evidence for the utility of loan loss provision as an in-house investment index for dispersed organizations, assuming the investment thesis has to do with picking winners rather than subsidizing struggling subsidiaries.

For Su, this research complicates commonly held beliefs about bank consolidation producing slow-moving behemoths getting by on sheer market power. “We often hear that bank holding companies should act as a ‘source of strength’ for subsidiaries,” she says. “There is some truth to the ‘source of strength’ idea, but our paper also observes that holding companies don’t just allocate funds to save subsidiaries from failing. They’re also allocating funds for the better-performing ones, when the accounting reporting quality is good, to help them thrive.”

Su also surmises that the decision-making method covered in her paper—HQ referencing internal accounting information as a gauge of quality—could apply outside banking. For example, it could come into play when evaluating subsidiary managers’ performance prior to a turnover decision.

Nonetheless, Su recommends that leaders maintain a balanced informational environment. Internal accounting information should be used to augment, not replace, standard performance metrics such as ROA. “I guess we could roughly think about it in a two-by-two matrix,” she says. “The ideal scenario would be high ROA, with high information quality. You could also have high ROA and low information quality—that means you’re cooking your numbers.”

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Barbara Su

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‘Nothing to see here’: How corporate spin confuses Wall Street

Katelynn C Hipolito — Wed, 08 Oct 2025 14:38:35 +0000

‘Nothing to see here’: How corporate spin confuses Wall Street Katelynn C Hipolito Wed, 10/08/2025 - 10:38

Managers’ attempts to distract investors from bad news have serious implications for market efficiency.

Public-relations professionals call it “getting ahead of the story”—feeding positive spin to the media to blunt the impact of unflattering news to come. Celebrities engage in it; so do companies when, for example, their forthcoming earnings report is destined to disappoint. But do these face-saving distraction tactics affect the long-term movement of share prices?

Min Shen, associate professor of accounting at Costello College of Business at 911��, recently published a paper in The Accounting Review suggesting that traders see through these pre-emptive disclosures of positive news, and change their info-seeking behavior accordingly.

Shen’s co-authors were Edward Xuejun Li of Baruch College, K. Ramesh of Rice University, and Joanna Shuang Wu of University of Rochester.

The researchers analyzed share price movements surrounding corporate and non-corporate disclosures between January 2003 and March 2016 (35,330 firm-year observations in their sample). Corporate disclosures included earnings announcements, management guidance, press releases, SEC filings, etc. Non-corporate disclosures come from intermediaries such as analysts, credit rating agencies and journalistic outlets.

Splitting the firm-years into “good” and “bad” years based on stock performance, the researchers uncovered a striking discrepancy. During a bad year (i.e. when a company was underperforming relative to peers), the market’s immediate response to corporate disclosures had much less of a lingering effect, accounting for a mere 40 percent of price discovery over the course of the year. The equivalent figure for good years was around 60 percent.

Shen stresses that corporate disclosures were no less frequent during bad years, but they were seen as less informative. Press releases were one of the main drivers of the disparity: Their contribution to price discovery fell from an average of 27 percent during good years, to three percent in bad times.

Min Shen. Photo by Hannah Patterson/Costello College of Business.

“A company might rush a press release announcing a new AI model, or a new five-year contract with the government, in anticipation of an upcoming adverse disclosure,” Shen says. “And for bad news, they try to delay it as much as possible, until they are forced to disclose in mandatory SEC filings.”

This gap was basically unaffected by the 2008 global financial crisis. “We picked 2009 as the cut-off year, and compared pre-crisis to post-crisis,” Shen says. “In the post-crisis period, we find management teams became somewhat more cautious and less inclined to withhold bad news. So the gap between good-news and bad-news years narrowed a bit, but the main findings still hold.”

So if official disclosures from underperforming companies became less influential, where was the market getting its information during bad years? In the absence of reliable public disclosures, investors intensified their search for private information. The price-setting power of so-called “extreme order imbalances”—incidents of severely lopsided supply and demand that are often triggered by private information-sharing—was greater during bad years.

Moreover, by sharing what they know, outside monitors such as short sellers, equity analysts, and dedicated long-term institutional investors can put pressure on managers to be more transparent about bad news. Shen and her co-authors found that more stringent external monitoring by these market participants was associated with faster disclosure of bad news. When managers see that the news they are trying to bury is leaking out anyway through other channels, they may conclude that there’s nothing to be gained by continuing the cover-up.

Shen says her paper calls attention to how conflicting managerial incentives shape disclosure. “Managers are driven by compensation and job security incentives, which are pegged to benchmarks such as target share price or debt-to-equity ratio. That’s why they disclose good news as fast as possible, and try to hide bad news.”

But managers’ attempts to control the narrative are bounded by government regulations (e.g. SEC reporting requirements) and the company’s risk of a shareholder lawsuit that may follow a sudden decline in share price. Therefore, Shen suggests that policymakers could consider playing a more active role.

“SEC filings are quite significant for price discovery during bad years and insignificant during good years,” Shen says. “Mandatory disclosure brings bad news to light faster, because management faces more severe penalties and heightened litigation risk if they insist on burying it.”

In This Story

Min Shen

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MS in Accounting student leader receives PCAOB Scholarship

Katelynn C Hipolito — Tue, 29 Jul 2025 16:22:56 +0000

MS in Accounting student leader receives PCAOB Scholarship Katelynn C Hipolito Tue, 07/29/2025 - 12:22

“He advocated for exploring the possibilities of a career in accounting to the entire class,” says Khaled Alkurd. “I took him up on that, and I have been very happy ever since.”

Khaled Alkurd

After taking the Survey of Accounting 203 course with 911�� alumnus Muhammad Awais, BS Accounting ‘13, MS Accounting ‘14, an adjunct instructor at the Costello College of Business, Khaled Alkurd knew everything he needed to know to switch his area of study from marketing to accounting.

“He advocated for exploring the possibilities of a career in accounting to the entire class,” says Alkurd. “I took him up on that, and I have been very happy ever since.”

Alkurd continues to excel in his accounting studies, planning to graduate with his undergraduate degree in the fall of 2025 and with his MS in Accounting in the spring of 2026, through the Bachelor's Accelerated Master's (BAM) Program.

Further boosting his resume and job prospects, he was named a PCAOB scholar following his spring 2025 semester. “It is something that means a lot to me and helps with my confidence and assurance to know that, indeed, auditing is a field that is a good fit for me,” he says.

The Accounting 461 course and the way it was taught by Ethan Kinory, an instructional assistant professor in accounting at Costello, was the most significant factor in changing Alkurd’s interest from the tax side of accounting to auditing. With Kinory’s guidance, he found that he had a knack for inspecting details for accuracy. “I believe he is a remarkable professor,” says Alkurd. “He cares deeply about his students.” Though Accounting 461 has had, perhaps, the biggest impact so far, each class has contributed more to Alkurd’s understanding, growth, and ambitions. “My experience has been excellent,” he says. “The entire faculty is extremely supportive. They have all been amazing in their own ways and rights.”

Ethan Kinory was also the one who recommended to Alkurd that he run for president of 911��’s chapter of Beta Alpha Psi, an international organization for accounting, finance, and information systems majors that he had already been heavily involved in. It is through Beta Alpha Psi that he got connected with Baker Tilly for an internship, and it helped him secure the PCAOB scholarship as well.

In addition to serving as president of Beta Alpha Psi in the fall, Alkurd will be the student ambassador for the MS in Accounting program, a role he’s very much looking forward to. "I'm excited to share my passion for accounting and the incredible opportunities available within the MS program with prospective students," he says. Costello’s student ambassadors are exceptional students who embody the values of leadership, community engagement, and professional excellence. Having gotten so much out of his Costello experience already, he is excited to lead in these extracurriculars and help others.

Khaled Alkurd is making the most of his opportunities at the Costello College of Business by being highly engaged.

“If you put your best foot forward, if you attend and apply yourself, you will succeed. There are resources available. You just have to show the engagement and you’ll be rewarded tremendously,” says Khaled Alkurd, current Accounting student at the Costello College of Business at 911��.

In the future, Alkurd plans to stay in the region and work at a large corporate firm, possibly one of the Big Four firms. He aims to leverage his strong academic foundation, leadership experience, and newfound PCAOB scholar status to contribute to complex financial audits and make a significant impact in the accounting profession.

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Ethan Kinory

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Costello College of Business Students

Bachelor’s/Accelerated Master’s program

Why it doesn’t—and shouldn’t—always pay to be a super-successful CEO

Jennifer Anzaldi — Wed, 07 May 2025 12:46:40 +0000

Why it doesn’t—and shouldn’t—always pay to be a super-successful CEO Jennifer Anzaldi Wed, 05/07/2025 - 08:46

In This Story

JK Aier

Are corporate boards acting as stabilizing forces for their firms, or enablers of extreme greed? That’s one of the questions implied by current debates about so-called “runaway CEO pay.” It’s not entirely clear how the CEO incentives set by the board can be squared with its fiduciary duty to safeguard long-term shareholder value. That’s largely due to the mystery surrounding how CEO compensation is determined in the first place.

“It’s a black box,” says JK Aier, senior associate dean for academic affairs and global engagement and associate professor of accounting at the Donald G. Costello College of Business at 911��. “We don’t know why boards give bonuses, why CEOs get a raise—in other words, what goes on behind the scenes.”

JK Aier

Aier’s academic paper, forthcoming in Accounting and Business Research, circumvents this problem by focusing on cases posing stark contrasts between short- and long-term value. (Jian Cao of Florida Atlantic University, Zhanel DeVides of Penn State Abington and Ki Kyung Song of West Chester University co-authored.) When a company reports increased earnings year after year, a short-sighted board would raise CEO compensation in line with that performance, incentivizing the CEO to keep up the good work. To cooler heads, however, such a long “earnings string” would raise red flags, prompting a more cautious stance toward compensation.

“Continuous growth or expectations of continuous growth create adverse incentives and challenges because it’s not possible, given how business cycles work,” says Aier. “It may create undue pressure on CEOs to maintain growth somehow if it is strongly tied to compensation.” A strict pay-for-performance approach could induce CEOs to take risks that endanger long-term firm value, such as engaging in managerial manipulation. But how religiously do boards adhere to pay-for-performance?

The researchers examined earnings patterns and CEO compensation for thousands of firms during the period 1999-2018 (11,197 firm-year observations in all). About two-thirds of the firm-years saw an increase in earnings; of those, fewer than 20 percent were in their sixth year or later in an unbroken earnings string.

Across the sample, CEO compensation over time was responsive to earnings patterns. For the first few years of the string, boards lavished their outperforming CEOs with expanding pay packets. But rewards tapered off in subsequent years, indicating that boards may be aware of the risks of over-incentivizing long patterns of increased earnings.

A similar relationship existed for firms with negative earnings strings. After sharply reducing compensation in the first two years of losses, boards stopped penalizing struggling CEOs and kept compensation fairly flat.

“If a company continues to have losses, will directors keep penalizing the CEO? If they do, no one will want to work for that company,” Aier says. “Instead, giving CEOs a runway during a string of continuous losses provides them the opportunity to turn things around.”

The researchers also looked at the probability of CEO turnover as it related to earnings patterns. Surprisingly, CEOs who presided over uncommonly long upward strings faced increased odds of turnover, which Aier attributes in part to board suspicions. “On the profit side, there seems to be a loss of trust that this is even possible,” he says. “Boards are willing to look at changing the CEO because they believe these strings may be unsustainable. In other words, something smells fishy to them.”

The opposite dynamic held true for poorly performing firms. CEO turnover risk declined over the longer downward strings, presumably reflecting broader concerns about retaining talent during prolonged periods of financial difficulty.

In sum, board compensation committees seem highly attentive to earnings patterns, monitoring them for long-term risks and adjusting CEO pay packets accordingly. This cuts against the idea that directors may be complicit in a CEO money grab that imperils firms’ long-term standing.

Moreover, the researchers found that the above-mentioned relationship between earnings patterns and CEO compensation was much stronger for firms experiencing lower competition and higher earnings persistence. This suggests that where market discipline is lacking, directors will pay even closer attention to earnings strings in order to keep CEOs honest.

“Our research suggests that boards pay attention to their monitoring role,” Aier concludes. “Boards are proactive; they care not only about whether the company is doing well, but also how performance is achieved.”

Hedging long-term risks by changing CEO compensation is one way directors can prevent misaligned incentives from forming. “The board’s role goes beyond making sure things go smoothly. It is also looking into the future in terms of what’s needed for the company and its stakeholders, and making sure the operations and the management of the company are also looking at performance from that perspective,” Aier says.

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Strategy - Costello

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Study: Left-handed CEOs are more innovative

Jennifer Anzaldi — Wed, 30 Apr 2025 02:32:28 +0000

Study: Left-handed CEOs are more innovative Jennifer Anzaldi Tue, 04/29/2025 - 22:32

In This Story

June Woo Park

Q: What do Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg have in common (besides the obvious)?
A: All three belong to a community comprising about 10 percent of the population—the community of the left-handed.

And they’re far from the only business luminaries who are members. Steve Forbes, Oprah Winfrey, and Lou Gerstner (of IBM fame) are left-handed, as were John D. Rockefeller, Henry Ford and Ratan Tata.

Of course, this could be a mere coincidence—but perhaps not. The popular belief that left-handers think more creatively—and hence may enjoy an innovative edge in business—has been supported by cognitive neuroscience research, which shows that the left hand is controlled by the brain’s right hemisphere, a region closely associated with creative thinking. However, conflicting findings and limited research evidence prevent broad conclusions about the correlation between creativity and handedness, let alone its potential implications for business leadership.

A forthcoming research publication by Long Chen and June Woo Park, two accounting professors at the Costello College of Business at 911��, constitutes the first rigorous scholarly investigation into whether—and how—handedness plays a role in business innovation.

June Woo Park and Long Chen

The paper was co-authored by Albert Tsang of Southern University of Science and Technology and Xiaofang Xu of Beijing Technology and Business University.

The researchers searched Google for photos and videos of S&P 500 CEOs engaged in activities like writing, throwing, drawing, and eating to determine their dominant hand, if wasn’t already disclosed in published sources. “We looked at pictures of them on the golf course to see how they held their clubs,” Park explains. “We also noted which wrist they wore their watch on; left-handed people often wear it on the right.” When in doubt, they followed up with calls or emails to the respective companies. All in all, they were able to identify the handedness of 1,008 CEOs across 472 companies: 91.4 percent were right-handed, 7.9 percent left-handed, and 0.7 percent mixed.

The researchers then looked at the numbers of patents and citations received by the firms from 1992 to 2015. They controlled for firm and industry characteristics, as well as other personal traits known to affect CEO innovativeness (such as age, education, risk preference shaped by experience, birth order, and founder status).

In addition, they performed several follow-up tests, including one focused on a narrow subset of firms that unexpectedly switched from a right-handed CEO to a left-handed one due to unforeseeable circumstances such as death or illness.

Every variation of the study produced essentially the same result: Firms led by left-handed CEOs demonstrate significantly higher innovative output. The differences were qualitative as well as quantitative. Patents under left-handed leadership were more likely to represent something new under the sun, rather than a spin-off from established technology.

The researchers hypothesized that the left-handers’ creative orientation would impact the way they ran their firms, including hiring decisions. Indeed, they found that companies applied for more H-1B and STEM visas when left-handers were at the helm. This emphasis on talent acquisition was not only a key indicator of innovation commitment, but may have also contributed to the firms’ creative advantage.

“We find that left-handed CEOs are more likely to hire immigrant inventors in STEM fields, and are also more likely to be inventors themselves,” Chen says. “These findings strengthen our argument by highlighting specific ways in which left-handed CEOs may directly enhance firm innovation.”

Still, piling up patents doesn’t automatically produce outcomes that will make customers and shareholders happy. Ultimately, firm performance is what matters in evaluating business success. As additional analyses in the study suggest, firms led by left-handers had higher return on assets and stronger buy-and-hold returns than peers with a right-handed leader.

“They outperformed their counterparts,” Park summarizes. “Investors are drawn to innovative firms, and left-handedness is one of the factors investors could use in their stock-picking.”

Yet innovative success is complex and multifaceted. Left-handedness is only one potentially meaningful trait among many—a lot more are yet to be explored.

“Our results are based on a large sample. But investors should not assume a CEO that is not left-handed lacks innovative potential,” Chen says.

For their ongoing and future research projects, Chen and Park are looking beyond left-handedness to explore other deeply personal CEO traits that may have business implications.

“We find it fascinating to draw on insights from disciplines outside accounting and finance,” Chen says. “CEO decisions may be shaped by factors like family experiences, genetics, academic background, career paths, and more—really, the full range of experiences that makes them who they are. Understanding that can help market participants better interpret and predict CEOs’ decision-making.”

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Does the world need a ‘universal language’ of accounting?

Jennifer Anzaldi — Tue, 07 Jan 2025 15:40:40 +0000

Does the world need a ‘universal language’ of accounting? Jennifer Anzaldi Tue, 01/07/2025 - 10:40

In This Story

David S. Koo

In the early years of the 21st century, investors had good reason to hope that a single, globally accepted accounting framework would soon emerge to unite the world’s financial markets. It seemed inevitable that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would abandon its devotion to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and adopt the Esperanto-like International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

Then came the financial crisis, which punctured optimism around globalization. In 2012, an SEC staff report confirmed the shift in sentiment, pointedly withholding an anticipated timeline for IFRS adoption.

David Koo

However, the dream of convergence continues, and may be slowly coming true, albeit in a low-key way. According to David Koo, assistant professor of accounting at Costello College of Business at 911��, having two competing frameworks may even be a net benefit for cross-market comparability.

Koo's latest paper, forthcoming in The International Journal of Accounting and co-authored with John X. Jiang and Isabel Wang of Michigan State University, plumbs accounting research, industry analyses and corporate data to draw high-level conclusions about the “competition” between U.S.-GAAP and IFRS.

After 2012, some experts were concerned that the apparent snub from the SEC would dissuade undecided countries from signing onto IFRS, thereby increasing fragmentation. Yet Koo and his co-authors show that the opposite happened: Between 2011 and 2022, IFRS adoption surged from 53.3% to 76.7% among non-North American firms.

“People were concerned that IFRS’ influence would diminish if the U.S. did not adopt, but it didn’t happen,” Koo summarizes. “According to our survey, IFRS is thriving and has become the most widely used accounting standard.”

Another fear was that U.S.-GAAP and IFRS would become more distinct over time, which would hamper comparability. However, the researchers note that the SEC maintains a position on the IFRS Foundation Monitoring Board. Also, several Americans sit on the 14-member International Accounting Standards Board, the oversight body for IFRS.

Indeed, the researchers found that the discrepancies between the two frameworks peaked before 2012, according to comparisons performed over time by KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.

“The accounting boards work tightly together; they have corresponded in an active way for the past 10 to 15 years,” Koo says. “It seems that they are learning from each other. They are separate—however, when they introduce new standards, they collaborate.”

Koo surmises that this sort of “managed divergence” might be preferable in some ways to universal adoption of IFRS. Because the two frameworks are seen as roughly equivalent in terms of quality, the informational benefit of switching from one to the other might not justify the transition cost.

“People were concerned that IFRS’ influence would diminish if the U.S. did not adopt, but it didn’t happen,” Koo summarizes. “According to our survey, IFRS is thriving and has become the most widely used accounting standard.”

Additionally, competing frameworks create a balance of power that might prove more sustainable over the long term than a global monopoly. “If we adopt IFRS universally, most companies would follow the same standard,” Koo says. “This widespread influence would be so huge in that case that it might cause conflict or tension about the standard-setting process. Having Independent processes can allow countries to have some autonomy, which can be beneficial.”

The researchers suggest that the same principle could apply to current efforts to develop global standards for mandatory sustainability reporting. The European Union, Asia, and North America differ greatly from one another in economic development, cultural values, etc. As a result, multinational companies doing business across these regions face a frustrating patchwork of expectations when it comes to climate and other impact-based disclosures. Here, too, some form of “managed divergence” might be the best way forward, with jurisdictions remaining separate while engaging in close collaboration.

“Companies want to have standardized expectations in terms of sustainability, but it is not easy,” Koo says. “Similar to financial reporting, the two main pillars will likely be the U.S. and EU, which both have advanced standards. Other countries will choose depending on their comfort.”

“Having two good standards in the world may be better than one.”

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Costello Research SEC/PCAOB

When CEOs are haunted by memories of past recessions

Jennifer Anzaldi — Tue, 12 Nov 2024 19:43:41 +0000

When CEOs are haunted by memories of past recessions Jennifer Anzaldi Tue, 11/12/2024 - 14:43

In This Story

David S. Koo

The economy, we’re often reminded, is cyclical. But we all hope our careers won’t be. That means those of us who make it to the very top—CEOs, for instance—may be unduly influenced by memories of prior economic go-rounds. David Koo, assistant professor of accounting in the Donald G. Costello College of Business at 911��, has found that memories of past recessions, triggered by recent ones, can weigh on chief executives’ decisions, literally for years.

Koo’s paper, co-authored by Isabel Wang of Michigan State University and Shuting Wu of Cal State Fullerton, is forthcoming in Management Science.

David Koo

The paper was inspired by trends in research outside the accounting field. “In the economics area, they have started looking at how executives’ memories of recessions can affect important decision-making right now,” Koo says. “We are trying to connect these emerging trends to the accounting area by focusing on pessimistic bias in their outlook of the company’s performance.”

The researchers adopted the 2008 financial crisis as a key moment for triggering veteran CEOs’ memories of prior financial downturns. They analyzed annual management earnings forecasts for U.S. public companies for the period 2002-2018, alongside the characteristics and career histories of the CEOs who issued them. “We used the first forecast of the year for each year, because on average these are more optimistic,” Koo explains. “Usually, nobody wants to say anything negative at the beginning of a year.” The final data-set comprised 3,678 earnings forecasts from 466 CEOs.

Koo and his co-authors discovered that CEOs who had previously led companies through at least one past recession issued significantly more pessimistic forecasts post-2008 than they had before the crisis. As a general rule, the more recessions a CEO had undergone in their tenure at the top, the more pessimistic their post-crisis forecasts tended to be.

The same pessimistic pattern was not evident for CEOs who had not experienced a recession before 2008. Translating their findings into economic terms, the researchers concluded that one standard deviation of the memory-triggered pessimism effect was equivalent to 0.23-0.29 percent of share price.

Further, the post-crisis pessimism did not make the forecasts more accurate. It’s safe to say, then, that the memory-triggered CEOs were, knowingly or not, displaying excessive caution and conservatism in their earnings forecasts. To be sure, anyone’s outlook can darken with age, independent of their real-world experience. So the researchers performed subsequent checks to determine whether the increased pessimism was more closely related to growing older, or to specific memories of past recessions.

“Our takeaway is, if we have two same-age CEOs, one who has experience navigating recessions as a CEO and one who does not, the first one will become more pessimistic after the crisis,” Koo says.

The more highly skilled CEOs (as measured by a widely accepted scale for managerial ability) exhibited less memory-induced pessimism, while CEOs who led more complex firms with a lot of moving parts were more prone to pessimism. “We expected that the manager-specific effect would be more significant when managers were under more demanding pressure or had more discretion,” Koo explains.

As the 2008 financial crisis itself faded into memory, seasoned CEOs gradually let go of their pessimistic bias. But it took three years, on average, for their forecasts to fully recover. We normally think of past experience as an aid to learning, but here it seems that the opposite was the case: Memories of past experiences with recessions slowed down CEOs’ post-crisis learning process.

“Prior research has found that past experiences can help people more rationally and then more wisely handle an ongoing crisis,” Koo says. “But at the same time, executives are also human beings. They may be scarred by their experiences and that can induce them to be excessively negative or pessimistic when they go through a financial crisis.”

Of course, that doesn’t mean that the veteran CEOs were less effective at guiding their firms through post-crisis recovery. Koo emphasizes that his findings do not capture whether, and how quickly, companies bounced back from the 2008 recession.

“Memory may not be the most dominant factor in our decision-making, but it still can influence executives even in their managerial decision-making,” Koo advises.

The lesson, then, is one for investors and other market players to store in their own memories for the next economic downturn: Take CEOs’ post-crisis predictions with at least a grain of salt.

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Costello Research Evaluating Performance

Strategy - Costello

Costello Research Strategic Management

Costello Research Risk Management

Costello Research Corporate Finance

Costello Research Financial Crises

Costello Research Health & Well-being at Work

GenAI brings us closer to automating investment expertise

Jennifer Anzaldi — Thu, 22 Aug 2024 18:39:34 +0000

GenAI brings us closer to automating investment expertise Jennifer Anzaldi Thu, 08/22/2024 - 14:39

In This Story

Yi Cao

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and Google Gemini excel at being trained on large data-sets to generate informative responses to prompts. Yi Cao, an assistant professor of accounting at the Donald G. Costello College of Business at 911��, and Long Chen, associate professor and area chair of accounting at Costello, are actively exploring how individual investors can use LLMs to glean market insights from the dizzying array of available data about companies.

Long Chen and Yi Cao

Their new working paper, co-authored with Jennifer Wu Tucker of the University of Florida and Chi Wan of University of Massachusetts Boston, examines AI’s ability to identify “peer firms,” or product market competitors in an industry.

Cao explains the significance of selecting peers by relating this process to the real-estate market. “The capital market is similar to the real-estate market in that a firm’s value is partially determined by the value of its peers. In the real-estate market, we price a home based on the value of comparable properties in the neighborhood, or the so-called 'comps.' In our paper, we aim to leverage the power of LLMs to identify comps for evaluating firm value.”

This task is at least as difficult as it is essential. It takes much time, skill and effort to gather, aggregate and manage data to select peers. However, the researchers reasoned that LLMs could do a lot of the heavy lifting of data aggregation and analysis for the individual investors, and produce a list of peers comparable in validity to that identified by human experts.

“The advantage is in the capability to utilize all the information potentially out there so that it is at least performing as well as other traditional methods that can help us investors and researchers,” says Cao.

For the study, Chen and Cao employed Bard from Google, now known as “Gemini,” as their LLM of choice because “Bard has a greater ability to utilize its pre-training data, which is arguably larger than ChatGPT’s and with more parameters,” says Cao.

After defining “product market competition” and forming a prompt for Bard, the researchers instructed Bard to limit its knowledge pool to a specific year within the period 1981-2023, in order to avoid “look-ahead bias,” i.e., future information scrambling the results.

“We need to understand that LLMs are actually a very powerful, new tool, unmatched in their efficiency, ability to process vast amounts of information at a low cost, and accessibility to the general public.”

They limited focal firms to large, publicly listed companies as there is less data out there for smaller or private firms. In all, the data-set comprised more than 300,000 focal firm-years.

On average, the LLM could generate about seven peer firms for a focal firm, a number that is similar to the SEC recommendations on how firms should disclose their segments.

The researchers then compared the LLM’s performance to the lists generated by three human experts for a set of 40 leading computer software companies. The average overlap was a little over 40 percent, greater than expected.

They also compared the AI-identified peer lists to two alternative systems for identifying peers: the federal government’s Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes and Text-based Network Industry Classification (TNIC), which compares firms based on linguistic similarities in their 10-K filings. The LLM’s output overlapped significantly with TNIC’s. Plus, the peers identified by the LLM were generally a better fit than those from SIC and TNIC, as their monthly stock returns hewed closer to the focal firm.

But TNIC outperformed the LLM in identifying peers for mid-sized firms within the sample, indicating that it is not a clear-cut case of universal LLM superiority.

“It’s especially beneficial for individual investors—as all the cost concerns that we’re talking about are especially relevant for them,” Chen adds.

Regarding the future of LLM, Chen states, “There are always costs and benefits associated with using generative AI. It is uncertain whether current systems will soon be obsolete.” When asked about the SEC adopting an AI tool for investors, Chen emphasizes that users need to understand the pros and cons of using AI to make their informed judgments “because AI cannot be held responsible for the information it provides or for how it is utilized.”

Chen concludes, “We need to embrace this new technology, but we must recognize that it is not yet in a perfect state. Competition to improve the technology is fierce. Our findings might just represent the lower bound of the effectiveness of the technology.”

Topics

Costello Research Innovation Strategy

Costello Research SEC/PCAOB

Costello Research Private Funds

Costello Research Market Efficiency